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FurtherEfforts at Liberalization:
1967 to Early 1973
From1967 to 1972 the growth of GNP, exports, and imports continued at a
very rapid pace. While foreign private capital imports replaced foreign assis-
tance as the major source of foreign savings, the exchange rate, which had
been pegged at 270 won to the dollar by the Bank of Korea since August 1965,
was allowed to devalue gradually beginning in 1968. The rate reached 326 in
June 1971 and then 370 following a further devaluation of 13 percent. Later
in 1971, gradual devaluation was allowed to resume and it continued until
June 1972 when the rate was pegged at about 400 won to the dollar.
A follow-up trade liberalization program, launched in 1967, switched the
positive-list approach to trade controls to a negative-list approach and revised
the tariff structure so as to eliminate some of the very high rates. Another
tariff reform, discussed throughout much of 1972, was instituted in early
1973.
In August 1972, a new set of economic policy reforms was announced.
These reforms included a set of regulations to govern the so-called unorga-
nized money market, reductions in bank interest rates, price stabilization efforts,
continued stabilization of the exchange rate, reduction in export incentives,
and liberalization of import controls.
Despite these and other attempts at further liberalization and reform,
resort to the old price-distorting policies and controls was common. A number
of factors were involved. First, any adverse trends in the balance of payments
prompted a return to the old methods. For example, when import demand in-
creased sharply in late 1968, the government placed additional import items
on the restricted list and increased export incentives.
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Secondly, as debt service payments began to rise, even though foreign
exchange holdings seemed quite adequate in the late 1960s and early 1970s,
concern over future debt repayments increased along with a fear for the vulner-
ability of the basic balance of payments. Restrictions on capital movements
were strengthened in 1970.
Finally, and probably most important, certain vested interests in the busi-
ness community had much to lose from further liberalization and favored a
return to price-distorting mechanisms. Since these interests wielded consider-
able political power, the tariff reform of 1967 brought few real changes
although the initial proposals of the Ministry of Finance would have substan-
tially simplified the tariff structure. The business interests, many of them ex-
porters who benefited greatly from tariff exemptions and wastage allowances,
exerted pressure through the Ministry of Commerce and Industry, and thus
fostered a bureaucratic struggle between the two ministries. For good measure,
related business groups staged a sit-down protest against the tariff change in
the offices of the Ministry of Finance.
In another demonstration of their influence, the vested interests exerted
strong pressure on the Ministry of Finance just prior to the June 1971 deval-
at a uation. The pressure came mainly from large firms with heavy foreign debts
;sis- because devaluation would greatly increase the burden of repaying their for-
had eign loans, which were denominated in dollais. The holders of foreign debt
p65, were compensated by increased availability of local loans. The government
S in also felt it had to peg the exchange rate at its new value rather than continue
ater with a gliding peg.
Intil From 1967 to 1972, pressure to extend export subsidies increased while
monopoly rights for new export markets and products were granted in 1967
the and 1968. Exporters were ranked according to performance and the more
•sed successful were given better administrative treatment. Freight and power rate
her discounts were given to large exporters, wastage allowances were expanded,
arty and interest rate subsidies on loans to exporters grew very rapidly. In early
1973, however, some of the subsidies were reduced or eliminated.
ied. The period from 1967 to early 1973 can be characterized as a prolonga-
tion of Phase IV while attempts to consolidate reforms continued. But South
Korea did not quite achieve a completely liberalized Phase IV regime because
yes, reforms were periodically retarded by adverse economic developments and by
increasingly effective political resistance from certain business interests opposed
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EFFORTS TO LIBERALIZE TRADE, 1967
TO EARLY 1973 se
in
Trade liberalization was attempted in 1967 through a change from the posi-
tive-list system of import controls to the negative list,1 and through tariff 01
reform. The first of these measures was much more successful than the second.
The basic impetus for the attempted liberalization was the marked increase
in foreign exchange holdings in 1966 brought about by a rapid expansion of
commodityexports, increased service earnings expatriated by South Korean
nationals in Viet Nam and West Germany, and a Larger inflow of foreign loans
(including cash loans). rc
As shown in Table 5—1, the new negative-list program greatly enlarged
the number of Automatic Approval (AA) items for import. More than half of t14
the 30,000 commodities specified in the SITC (Standard International Trade
Classification) manual became AA items since they were excluded from the
negative list. Prohibited or restricted items numbered 336 under the old sys-
tem and 12,872 under the new. This discrepancy, however, is misleading since S4
items omitted from the positive list had to be treated ad hoc and often were, fi4
in fact, prohibited or restricted. If these additional items are taken into ac-
count (see figures in parentheses in Table 5—1) the total number prohibited
and restricted under the positive-list system comes to. 26,484. The increase in
imports resulting directly from liberalization was approximately $27 million iq
in the final five months of 1967 and $68 million or 20 percent of total imports Ii
in1968 according to estimates by the Ministry of Commerce and Industry.
TABLE 5-1







Prohibited import items 244 (26,148)b 2,617
Restricted import items 92 10,255
Automatic Approval import items 3,760 17,128
Total 4,096 30,000
SouRcE: Ministry of Commerce and Industry.
a. The classification of commodities was based on the SITC Manual published by
the United Nations. It was roughly equivalent to the classification in the old program.
b. Total number of prohibited items, i.e., those explicitly prohibited plus those pro-
hibited because they were not listed in any category.
p.
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Although the government originally announced that it would gradually
expand trade liberalization from the start made in the second half of 1967, the
semiannual trade programs adopted in 1968 and afterwards showed a gradual
increase in the number of restricted items (Table 5—2). The increase in the
number of restricted items became more prominent beginning the second half
of 1968 as import demand expanded greatly during 1968 and 1969.
Even under the negative-list system, imports of machinery from countries
with which South Korea showed a trade deficit (Japan, for example) required
prior approval of the Ministry of Commerce and Industry, regardless of the
specifications in the trade program. The negative-list system applied only to
new, not used, commodities. Used commodities were subject to a more
restrictive set of rules.
The tariff reform announced on November 29, 1967 effective the first of
the year was presumably intended to simplify the system along lines suggested
by Ronald McKinnon. In his consultant's report (1967), Professor McKinnon
proposed a low uniform tariff rate of about 20 percent for most imports and a
higher rate (maximum 90 percent) on a selected group of industries that
South Korea really wanted to protect. He also proposed that high tariffs on
finished goods should be replaced with commodity taxes applicable to both
domestic and imported goods.
In the end, however,, the basic idea of a low, uniform tariff combined
with modestly higher rates for the protection of a selected, small number of
industries was not implemented with the result that the new customs law was
much the same as the old. The basic rates in the new law are compared with
TABLE 5-2




Secondhalf 1967 (final) 118 402 792 1,312
First half 1968 (original) 116 386 810 1,312
First half 1968 (final) 71 479 756 1,312
Secondhalf 1968(final) 76 508 728 1,312
Firsthalf 1969 (final) 75 514 723 1,312
Secondhalf 1969 (final) 74 530 708 1,312
First half 1970 (final) 73 526 713 1,312













NOTE: The classification of import items is based on the United Nations' SITC
Manual. The total shown in the table is an aggregation of 30,000 subitems.
Souaca: Ministry of Commerce and Industry.
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the old rates by major section of the BTN (Brussels Tariff Nomenclature)
classification in Table 5—3.Thetotal number of basic commodities subject to
duties was increased from 2,044 to 3,019. The new rates were slightly higher
than the old in all major sections of the BTN classification, except for sections
14, 18, and 19. The highest tariff rate in the old law, 250 percent, was now



















1.Live animals and animal products 32.5 38.4
2.Vegetable products 38.5 36.8
3.Animal & vegetable fats and oils 39.6 42.3
4.Prepared foodstuffs, beverages, spirits,
vinegar, and tobacco 84.3 95.1
5.Mineral products 15.9 25.2
6.Products of the chemical and allied industries 27.6 29.7
7.Artificial resins and plastic materials .32.4 34.5
8.Raw hides and skins, leather, fur skins
and articles thereof 55.2 58.1
9.Wood and articles of wood 40.1 44.2
10.Paper making material, paper and paperboard
and articles thereof 43.0 54.2
11.Textiles and textile articles 59.0 71.0
12.Footwear, headgear, umbrellas, sunshades,
whips, riding-crops, etc. 74.3 82.9
13.Articles of stone, plaster, cement,
asbestos, mica, etc. 48.9 53.8
14.Real pearls, precious stones and metals 43.7 36.1
15.Base metals and articles thereof 32.9 35.6
16.Machinery and mechanical appliances 27.4 30.6
17.Vehicles, aircraft, vessels, etc. 39.6 36.2
18.Optical, photographic, cinematographic,
measuring, checking and precision
instruments and apparatus, etc. 44.4 40.4
19.Arms and ammunition 54.7 37.7
20.Miscellaneous manufactured articles 78.9 81.9
21.Works of art, collectors'.pieces and antiques 0 0
Total number of items (2,044) (3,019)
NoTE: BTN—Brussels Tariff Nomenclature.
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Weighted average tariff rates by major product groups in the old and new
schedules are compared in Table 5—4.Thetable also compares the actual tariff
rates (the ratio of all actual tariff collections to c.i.f. imports) by major prod-
uct group. While statutory tariffs declined for most categories, actual tariff
collections increased because of the pattern of exemptions. It should be noted,
however, that the old and new tariff rates shown in Table 5—4includeboth
the regular tariff rates and the special rates levied to soak up margins on con-
trolled imports, while the simple average tariff rates shown in Table 5—3
represent only the regular tariffs.
Although the legal rate structure remained basically the same, the new
1968 law allowed for greater administrative flexibility. Administrative duties
could be levied on restricted commodities when imported in excess of quotas.
Under certain conditions, emergency duties, countervailing duties, and so-
called beneficial duties could be levied. The government had the authority to
change statutory rates by as much as 50 percent by administrative decree.
TABLE 5-4
Weighted Average Tariff Rates Compared:















Agriculture, forestry, and fishing 33.4 28.5. 11.5 14.2
Processed foods 55.2 54.1 6.6 25.5
Tobacco and beverages 132.6 106.3 22.3 40.3
Mining and energy 11.8 13.5 6.2 7.7
Construction materials 34.5 25.0 8.1 12.7
Intermediate products I 31.9 40.7 6.8 12.7
Intermediate products 11 51.8 44.7 10.6 14.4
Nondurable consumer goods 74.2 43.2 12.6 9.0
Consumer durables 74.5 73.7 20.4 34.4
Machinery 25.5 47.0 8.7 7.5
Transport equipment 12.8 19.8 1.4 1.6
Scraps and unclassifiable 25.4 33.1 8.3 18.2
Noncompetitive imports 21.9 16.9 21.9 9.2
Weighted Average 43.1 9.9 15.6
NOTE: Statutory and actual tariff rates include both the regular and special tariff
— rates.The average tariff rates were first obtained for 231 nonservice input-Output sectors,
weighted by actual imports and then aggregated into the major product groups using total
supply weights for respective years.a
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Even after the adoption of the new regular tariff schedule, the special
tariffs were still effective. The system of tariff exemptions under the new law fe:
remained almost the same as before. Imports of raw materials for the produc- w -
tionof exports, capital goods for export production and other major industries, fr
and capital goods imports by foreign-owned enterprises were exempt from
custom duties. Since exemptions were substantial and growing, mainly because i
of increased exports and increased tariff exemptions related to exports, the w
legal tariff structure did not have the same significance as it might have had
in other countries.
The government made some adjustments, however, to the list of tariff
exemptions in the period following the tariff reform. For instance, in October h
1968 the government removed 14 commodities from the customs-exempt list, i
including cement and petroleum. In addition, machinery and equipment for m
fertilizer and automobile plants and highway construction were transferred r
from the tariff-exempt list to the tariff-reduced list.
As import demand increased rapidly inlate1968, the government
tightened import prepayment deposit requirements for some categories of
imports, and further raised the amount of prepayment per dollar of import in
1969. Prepayment requirements for non-aid-financed imports on an L/C basis
from "specified areas" (within 10 days shipping time, mainly Japan) were
raised from 150 percent in the second half of 1968 to 200 percent in 1969 on
items whose basic tariff rates were in the range of 30—49 percent, except for
13 items. In 1970, all prepayment requirements were set equal to the 1968 El
level regardless of source. The prepayment requirements for imports on a p
documents-against-payment(D/P) basis were raised from 30 to 50 percent a
in 1969 on imports from the "specified areas"; however, for imports from
other areas the 5percentprepayment requirement was maintained as before.
'
Inaddition, items whose basic tariff rates exceeded 50 percent and nonessential
and luxury commodities designated by the United Nations Economic Corn-
mission for Asia and the Far East were excluded from the list of items im- 9
portable on a D/P basis.
Forimports on documents-against-acceptance (D/A) and on a usance
ti1
basis, an annual ceiling was established for each year. In 1969, the prepayment
requirements were raised from 10 to 30 percent on D/A imports from the
"specified areas," while a 30 percent prepayment requirement on usance im-
ports was maintained. Prepayment requirements for D/A and usance imports
S1
from all areas were unified at 30 percent in 1970.
In late 1972 and early 1973, some additional liberalization measures e
were taken. The number of automatic approval items was increased by elimi-
nating some of the previously restricted items from the negative list, and the 1
number of quota items was also reduced, while quota amounts per restricted F
item tended to increase. gGROWTH OF EXPORT SUBSIDIES 63
In early 1973, the special tariff, which had been used to tax large dif-
ferences between international and domestic market prices for some imports,
was completely abolished. There was also a general tariff reform, effective
from February 5, 1973, which changed regular tariff protection to encourage
new import substitution industries and reduce protection of old industries.
Tariff rates on heavy industrial and chemical products and intermediate goods
were raised, while the previous high rates on finished goods, particularly textile
d products, were generally reduced by about 10 to 50 percentage points. The
Ministry of Finance announced that the reform brought about a reduction in
g the simple average tariff rate from 38.8 to 31.3 percent. The tariff reform,
however, increased administrative authority to adjust the tariff rates within
• 100 percent of the legal rate. In fact, the tariff authorities established the ad-
ministrative rates on some imported raw materials much lower than the legal
d rates, in order to minimize the domestic cost-push effect of increases in inter-
national prices of major industrial raw materials which took place in 1973.
it Domestic commodity tax rates on both imported and domestically produced
)f commodities, particularly on electrical appliances and other household goods,
O were also reduced by about 10 to 15 percentage points.
is
•e
o GROWTH OF EXPORT SUBSIDIES
8 Export incentives continued to grow from 1967 to early 1973 (Table 3—3).
a Preferential loans became an increasingly powerful tool for export promotion
it after the interest rate reform of 1965. Since the reform raised ordinary bank
loan rates to 26 percent per annum (at which rate the excess demand for
loans was still positive) while leaving the rates on export loans unchanged,
interest subsidies implicit in the preferential loans for export increased consid-
erably after September 1965. Because of the increased differential between
commercial bank interest rates and preferential export rates and the prolifera-
e tion of various preferential loans for exports, the implicit interest subsidies for
exports increased from approximately 1.3 billion to 15.3 billion won, or from
e 7.6 won per dollar of export to 17.3 won between 1965 and 1970.2 As a per-
centage of total exports valued at the official exchange rate, interest rate sub-
sidies increased from about 3 percent in 1965 to 6 percent in 1970.
Table 5—5 shows the growth of the various subsidized loan schemes for
• exports between 1967 and 1970. Loans for offshore procurement and credit
for imports of capital equipment grew rapidly beginning in 1967. In 1968 and
•e 1969, the export industry operating loans (financed from the Counterpart
• d Fund) and export industry promotion loans were abolished. In their place, the
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in producing exports and for processing of agricultural and fishery products lat
for export in May and September 1969 (rows 11 and 12, Table 55). ent
The flexible wastage allowance grew in importance as an incentive to ex-
port during the late 1960s as the proportions of wastage allowed gradually fo
increased for many industries. The Korean Traders Association (1969) esti- a
mated that the implicit subsidies arising from the wastage allowances on
imported raw materials averaged 12.7 won per dollar export, or about 4.6 pr
percent of the official exchange rate in 1968. The amount of subsidies per (J
dollar, however, showed a wide variation by type of export commodity. For
instance, the subsidies implicit in wastage allowances were as high as 48 to 59
won per dollar of export (about 17 to 21 percent of the official exchange
rate) for woolen fabrics, rayon fabrics, and footwear. Business firms and
trade associations have lobbied persistently for increased wastage allowance.
The total amount of tax concessions for export grew rapidly from 1965
to 1970 (Table 5—6). Relief per dollar of export more than doubled in those
six years.
As mentioned in Chapter 3, importer's licenses were granted only to
firms whose export performance met minimum standards. The minimum ex-
alicense, which were set at $30,000 in 1964, were raised to ta
$100,000 in 1966, $200,000 in 1969, and $300,000 in 1970. In addition, in te
1969, traders were graded in four classes (blue-, white-, yellow-, and red-card
holders) on the basis of annual export performance. High performance of
traders were given a number of special benefits, including exemption of col-
TABLE 5—6 p1
Tax Concessions for Exports, 1965 to 1970
I
1965 1966 19671968 1969 1970
Internal tax (millions of
won) 2,8385,0217,72411,12717,20726,330
Regular and special tariff
(millions of won) 2,9625,3338,22419,26122,55134,700a
Total tax relief
(millions of won) 5,53010,35415,95230,38839,75861,030
Total exports"
(millions of dollars) 175.1250.3334.8486.2658.3882.2
Tax relief per dollar
of export (won) 31.6 41.4 47.6 62.5 60.4 69.1
Souxca: National Tax Administration.
a. Preliminary figures.










lateral for regular and special tariffs, relaxation of tax surveillance, and prefer-
ential treatment in foreign exchange allocations for overseas activities.
Certain exporters were given monopoly rights in new export markets or
for the export of new commodities. The system originated in 1962 but was not
applied to many commodities until 1967. Monopoly rights were given, among
others, for the following commodities: arrowroot wallpaper (all countries),
6 processed brassware (Japan), apples and pears (Taiwan), silk for sashes
• (Japan), artificial eyelashes (EEC), oak leaves (Japan), and rice cake
(Japan).
9 Finally, railway freight rates on export minerals were given a 30 percent
discount beginning in 1967. Export industries with power-receiving capacity
-•d of less than 200 KWH whose electric power costs amounted to more than 20
percent of total manufacturing costs were granted a 30 percent discount on
5 electricity charges.
As a follow-up on the August 1972 reforms, many export incentives
were reduced. The 50 percent reduction in tax on corporation and individual
business income earned from export business was abolished. The government
also announced a gradual adoption of a tariff-rebate system under which
tariffs are collected at first on all imports but collections for imported raw ma-
terials for exports are refunded later when actual exports occur. Until 1973,
imports of raw materials for exports were granted tariff exemptions at the time
of customs clearance, and tariffs plus some penalty were imposed later when
importers did not fulfill export obligations. Finally, the preferential interest
rate on export credit was raised from 6 to 7 percent. This slight increase, com-
bined with the general reduction in ordinary bank loan rates, reduced the im-
plicit subsidies from preferential loans to the export sector.
EXCHANGE RATES
From August 1965 through 1967, the exchange rate was pegged by the Bank
of Korea at about 271 won to the dollar. Beginning in 1968, the won was al-
lowed to devalue gradually, at a rate believed to be sufficient to maintain
purchasing power parity. The rate had reached 326 by June 1971, an an-
nual rate of increase close to 9 percent, when an abrupt devaluation of 13
percent brought the rate to 370. Until the end of the year, the rate remained
at this value and then after further gradual devaluation, the won was pegged
at about 400 to the dollar in June 1972.
The U.S. dollar, meanwhile, underwent two devaluations. The first, of
about 10 percent in early 1972, resulted from the Smithsonian Agreement of
December 1971. The second, also 10 percent, stemmed from a parity change
for the dollar in February 1973 and from the subsequent flotation of other
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currencies against the dollar in the spring of 1973. These changes had the
effect of devaluing the won with respect to currencies other than the dollar.
Since most of South Korea's foreign trade is carried on with countries other
than the United States, these changes in the value of the dollar made a great
difference in the cost of Korea's imports and the prices of her exports. r
Table 5—7 lists exchange rates on a purchasing-power-parity basis taking
into account the changes in the value of the won with respect to major cur-
rencies other than the dollar. Thus for 1972, the official rate averaged, over d
the year, 391.8 won to the dollar. The purchasing-power-parity rate was
254.1, and the purchasing-power-parity rate adjusted for changes in the value
of other currencies was 271.9 won to the dollar. B
In 1972 and early 1973, the Korean currency was very strong. Pre-
viously 1965 had been regarded as the year when the exchange value of the
TABLE 5-7
Official ExchangeRate at Purchasing Power Parity, 1965to1973
(1965prices)
1973
1965 1970 1971 1972(April)
I.Official exchange rate .
(won per dollar) 265.4 310.7347.7391.8398.9
2.Trade-weighted average WPI of .
major trading partners
(1965=100) 100.0 112.8 114.2 117.2 128.9
3.Korea's WPI (1965=100) 100.0 146.0 158.4 180.7 187.7
4.Purchasing-power-parity
exchange rate 1 x 2 ÷ 3 265.4 240.0250.7254.! 273.9
5.Trade-weighted effective" deval u-
ation due to foreign currency
realignments (percent) — — — 7.0 10.0
6.Purchasing-power-parity
exchange rate including foreign
currency realignments 265.4240.0 250.7271.9 301.3
7.Annual increase (percent) — 2.4 4.5 8.5 10.8
SOURCE: Table 5—8; Bank of Korea, Monthly Statistics, April 1973; Economic Plan.
ning Board, "Monthly Report on Economic Trends" (Briefing material for the President,
in Korean), June 11, 1973; U.S. Department of Commerce, Commerce Today, April 2,
1973, p. 4.
a. Exchange rates of the won vis-à-vis other major currencies were expressed in terms
of dollars using the dollar rate for major currencies prevailing in the base period, 1965.
These rates in terms of dollars were averaged using trading shares as weights in a weighted-
ave rage calculation. I
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the won placed Korea in its strongest competitive position ever. Yet compared
tar with 1965, the purchasing-power-parity exchange rate in April 1973 was 13
her percent higher. It was particularly favorable for exports, not only because of
eat the various devaluations both of the won and the dollar, but also because of
relative rates of inflation. Wholesale prices in Korea's major trading partners
:ing increased about 10 percent by April 1973 compared with the average for
:ur- 1972, while the South Korean index showed an increase of only 4.6 percent
ver during the same period.
was Between 1970 and April 1973, the purchasing-power-parity rate adjusted
ilue for currency realignments increased significantly (see line 7 of Table 5—7).
By 1972, the rate was 13 percent higher than it had been in 1970 and by
re- April 1973 it was 26 percent higher.
•the
QUANTITATIVE ESTIMATES
• OF THE RESTRICTIVENESS OF THE TRADE
I ANDPAYMENTS REGIME, 1958 TO 1970
Tables 5—8 and 5—9 show how the trade and payments regime has varied in
• I) degree of restrictiveness, both for exports and imports, and how various mea-
suresof effective exchange rates have changed over time.
Table 5—8 analyzes the effective exchange rate for exports. To obtain
these figures, the average export dollar premium and total subsidies per dollar
of export are added to the official exchange rate. For the period 1958—61, an
9 excess of the average free market price of export dollar certificates over the
77 official exchange rate was taken as export premium per dollar. In 1963 and
1964 a premium emerged because of the export-import link and the free mar-
ket sale of import entitlements attached to export dollars.
The won value of total export subsidies increased greatly over the decade
of the 1960s from 1.2 to 86.5 won per dollar of export. Direct subsidies were
).O important briefly from 1961 to 1964, but internal tax exemptions, customs
duties exemptions, and interest rate subsidies were all important throughout
most of the decade. Subsidies on freight and power rates, monopoly rights,
and administrative incentives are not quantified in Table 5—8 because they are
relatively small.3
'tan- Table 5—9 lists the components of the effective exchange rate on imports.
lent, Twoseparate effective rates are determined, one based on legal tariff rates,
•ii 2, and the other including an adjustment for exemptions from the legal tariff
rates. In addition to an adjustment for tariffs, the foreign exchange tax and
total premia on export dollars per dollar of imports are added to the average
ited- official exchange rate. The total adjustment based on actual tariffs, labelled
total actual tariffs and tariff equivalents per dollar of import in row B8 of70 FURTHER EFFORTS AT LIBERALIZATION: 1967 TO EARLY 1973
TABLE 5-8
Price-Level-Deflatedand Purchasing-Power-Parity Effective
Exchange Rates on Exports, 1958 to 1970
1958 19591960 1961
A.Official exchange rate (won per dollar) 50.0 50.0 62.5 127.5
B.Average export dollar premium (won per
dollar) 64.0 84.7 83.9 14.6
C.Export subsidies
1. Direct subsidy payments (mit. won) — — — 307
2. Internal tax exemptions (mil. won) na na na na
3. Customs duties exemptions (mu, won) na na na na
4. Interest rate subsidies (mit. 19 25 38 39
5. Totalexport subsidies (1—4) (mu, won) 19 25 38 346
6. Total exports (mil. dollars)b 16.5 19.8 32.8 40.9
7. Won subsidies per dollar export (5±6)
(won) 1.2 1.3 1.2 8.5
D.Effective exchange rate on exports
(A+B+C7) 115.2 136.0 147.6 150.6
E.Korea's wholesale price index (1965=100) 39.9 40.8 45.2 51.2
F.Price-level-deflated effective exchange rate
C.
on exports (D÷E)
Average wholesale price index of major
288.7333.3 326.5 294.1
trade partners (1965=100)d 97.2 97.7 97.9 98.3
H.Purchasing-power-parity effective exchange
rate on exports (FxG) 280.6325.6319.6 289.1
Table 5—9,fluctuatedbetween 1958 and 1965 from 14 to 38 won to the dol-
lar. Between 1965 and 1970, however, it remained remarkably steady at about
25 won to the dollar. Legal average tariffs and tariff equivalents on imports
increased markedly, from 23.3 won per dollar of import in 1962 to 72.0 won
in 1970. The increasing level of customs duty exemptions, however, kept
actual tariff collections per dollar of imports almost constant. The adjustments
for obtaining effective rates of exchange do not make allowance for price
premia resulting from quantitative restrictions, although these are taken into
account in the effective rates of protection calculated in Chapter 10. This
omission should not, however, be very important, since the special tariffs,
originally instituted in July 1961, tend to soak up such premia because of
the way they are administered.
The effective exchange rates for both exports and imports are deflated
by two price indexes: the South Korean wholesale price index and a purchas-






















1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970
130.0 130.0214.3265.4271.3270.7 276.6288.2310.7











































































97.6 98.3 98.5 100.0 102.8 104.0 105.6 108.8 112.8

















SOURCES: Bank of Korea; Ministry of Finance; USAID, Korea Mission.
a. Interest rate subsidies were calculated by estimating the average interest rate on all out-
standing loans to business firms at about 26 percent. This was taken as an estimate of the
equilibrium interest rate, and interest rate subsidies were taken as the subsidy element of all
loans at less than 26 percent. The estimate of the average interest rate on loans was derived
from Kim MahnJe (1970).
b. Includes military goods sales abroad.
c. Estimated by applying the average rate of tariff exemptions on imports of raw materials
and capital goods for export in 1968—69 to the value of c.i.f. imports for exports in 1970, because
actual exemption figures not available.
d. An average of wholesale price indexes in the United States and Japan, weighted by
Korea's annual trade volume with the respective countries. It is noted that Korea's imports from
and exports to the United States and Japan generally increased from about 43 percent of Korea's
total trade volume in 1958 to 83 percent in 1970.
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TABLE 5-9
Price-Level-Deflated and Purchasing-Power-Parity Effective
Exchange Rates on Imports, 1958 to 1970
price index to a weighted average wholesale price index of major
partners (the United States and Japan). The effective exchange rate
by the South Korean wholesale price index is called the price-level-deflated
effective exchange rate while the effective exchange rate deflated by the pur-
chasing-power-parity index is denoted the purchasing-power-parity effective
exchange rate. As an indicator of the incentive effect for exports and the rela-
tive price of imports, the purchasing-power-parity effective exchange rates
are the most meaningful. -
1958 1959 1960 1961
A.Official exchange rate (won per dollar) 50.0 50.0 62.5 127.5
B.Tariff & tariff equivalents
I. Actual tariff collections (mil. won) 2,9693,5595,1505,306
2. Tariff exemptions (mu. won) na na na na
3. Foreign exchange tax (mu, won) 1,425 4,7225,046 251
4. Premiums for total exports (mu. won)° 1,056 1,6772,752 597
5. Total actual tariffs and tariff equivalents
(1+3+4) (mil. won) 5,4509.95812,9486,154
6. Total legal tariffs and tariff equivalents
(1+2+3+4) (mu, won) na na na na
7. Total cii. imports (mil. dollars) 378.2 303.8 343.5 316.1
8. Actual tariffs and tariff equivalents per
dollar import (5÷7) (won) 14.4 32.8 37.7 19.5
9. Legal tariffs and tariff equivalents per
dollar import (6±7) (won) na na na na
C.Effective exchange rate on imports
1.Official exchange rate plus actual tariffs .
per dollar of import 64.0 82.8 100.2 147.0
2. Official exchange rate plus legal tariffs .
per dollar of import na na na na
D.Price-level-deflated effective exchange rate on
imports (deflated by line E in Table 5—8)
1. Cl÷E from Table 5—8 (actual basis) 160.4202.9221.6 287.1
2. C2÷E from Table 5—8 (legal basis) na na na na
E.Purchasing-power-parity effective exchange
rate on imports
I. Dl xGfrom Table 5—8 (actual basis)
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16.4 18.1 32.7 27.7 25.1 25.5 25.9 24.5 25.7
23.3 27.9 50.6 48.6 53.5 58.0 71.3 71.8 72.0
146.4 148.1 247.0 293.1296.4Z96.2 302.5 312.7 336.4



































a. Average premium per dollar export given in Table 5—8 multiplied by total value of exports
for each year.
b. Estimated by applying the average ratio of tariff reductions and exemptions to the value
of c.i.f. imports in 1968—69 to the value of imports for 1970.a
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The bias toward export promotion in the trade and payments regime
is clearly revealed by a comparison of purchasing-power-parity effective ex-
change rates for exports and imports (Table 5—10). The effective exchange
rate for exports exceeded the effective exchange rate for imports by a wide
margin in every year except for 1961—62 and 1965. In the periods 1958 to
1960 and 1963 to 1964, the major difference in effective rates for exports
and imports was caused by the export dollar premium. The devaluations of
January and February 1961 were soon followed by exchange rate unification.
The net effect on the export side was that the price-deflated effective exchange
rates declined rather than rose between 1960 and 1961. Thus, the devaluation
was more than offset by the elimination of premiums as far as exports were
concerned. On the import side, the price-deflated effective exchange rate of
won to the dollar increased sharply as the result of the devaluation. Thus, the
effective rates for exports and imports were brought closely into line in 1961
and 1962.
In 1963 and 1964, export dollar premia emerged again through the mar-
ketfor import entitlements, and the effective exchange rates for exports and
imports again diverged sharply. The devaluation of May 1964, from 130 to
257 won to the dollar, the float in the spring of 1965 to 271 won to the dollar,
and the 1964 unification of rates again brought the effective rates for exports
and imports into line. Despite the enormous nominal devaluation between
1963 and 1965 (about a 115 percent increase in the won/dollar rate) the
purchasing-power-parity effective won/dollar rate for exports rose only about F—
11 percent. On the import side, however, the devaluation was more effective.
After 1965, the export and import rates moved increasingly out of line
because of rapidly growing export subsidies. Export subsidies as a percent of
the effective exchange rate are compared with actual tariffs and tariff equiva-
lents as a percentage of the effective exchange rate in Table 5—10. By 1970,
about one-fifth of the effective exchange rate for exports represented subsidies
ofone form or another.
The quantitative estimates, outlined in tables 5—8 through 5—10, confirm
the impressions of our analysis of individual trade and exchange rate policies
—liberalization efforts in 196 1—62 and 1964—65, followed by rapid backslid-
ing in 1963 and gradual backsliding from 1967 to 1971. This pattern emerges
most clearly in Looking at columns D and E of Table 5—10. The premia and
subsidies as a percentage of the effective exchange rate on exports follow the
pattern of the liberalization efforts. Column G shows, however, that tariffs and
tariff equivalents declined steadily as a percentage of the effective exchange
rate on imports from 1959 to 1970 (except for a slight increase in 1967). The
major reasons are the elimination of the foreign exchange tax in 1962, the
gradual shift of imports toward capital goods with low or zero tariffs, and the
























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































From 1967 until June 1971, the effective exchange rate for exports was main-
tained by gradually increasing export subsidies. Attempts were made to liber-
alize import controls and tariffs but these foundered. A devaluation of the won
in June 1971, two dollar devaluations in 1972 and 1973, and a yen revalua-
tion caused the balance of payments to improve markedly and export subsidies
were partly dismantled in early 1973.
Under increasing pressure from business interests the government in late
1972 adopted a basically different strategy—one in which price inflation and
interest rates would be reduced and the exchange rate held stable. Though the
short-run response of the economy and the balance of payments has been satis-
factory, prior devaluations and a worldwide economic boom have been more
important factors than the reforms in producing the desired result. It remains
to be seen whether these policies will succeed in the long run. The strength of
the won may be eroded by continuing high costs of petroleum, grains, aNd
other natural resources that Korea imports in large quantities. It may be im-
possible to keep prices in check and further devaluations may be required to
keep the economy growing at a rapid pace.
NOTES
1. Under the positive-list system, only those items listed in the trade program could
be imported or exported, subject to specifications made in the program. But under the
negative-list system, the trade program lists only those items whose imports or exports
are either prohibited or restricted. Therefore, unlisted items in the negative-list program
represent Automatic Approval items, whereas the unlisted items inthe positive-list
program are either prohibited or restricted.
2. See Table 5—8fordetails on interest rate subsidies.
3. Subsidies by the wastage allowance on imported raw materials are considered
to be included in internal tax and customs duties exemptions, since the tax and customs
duties exemptions include exemptions for the proportion of wastage allowance (both
technological wastage loss and additional allowances).
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